Straeuli and Lane deserve a lot of credit

A friend remarked the other day that he has never been so wrong as he was about Rudolf Straeuli and the Springbok class of 2002.

He was probably not alone. Many anticipated that Straeuli would coach the no-nonsense, risk avoidance approach that he became known for at the Sharks (not always fairly, I may add). We waited for him to select a phalanx of big bashers rather than skilled runners at the back, we thought that brawn would be more important to the forwards than mobility.

If that is what we thought, then on almost every count we were wrong. While the Springboks again finished last on the Tri-Nations table, this time there was no doubting that they were a team on the upward graph.

There is also little denying that if they are not the most exciting team on the planet, they will be shortly.

The reasons for the emergence of so much young talent are many, but both Straeuli and his assistant Tim Lane deserve a lot of credit for breaking the South African mould by judging players on ability rather than size.

Brent Russell would not have come anywhere near a Springbok jersey under the coaching of some of Straeuli's predecessors. Arguably the same can be said of flyhalf Andre Pretorius.

But there is more to the sudden optimism of the long suffering Bok supporters than just the selection of a few classy attacking players. From day one Straeuli has exhibited a knack for making the right decisions, many of which immediately distinguished him from the line of unpopular decision makers who preceded him.

Here is a synopsis of what Straeuli did right in the recent home international season:

a) The decision to hold a Springbok trial at the end of May was a master-stroke. Unpopular though it was with some of the players, it was this decision which enabled Straeuli to enter the test matches with a team which very few critics could quibble with. Someone like Russell may never have made it were it not for the trial.

b) The cancellation of the block booking at Plettenberg Bay in favour of a fortnight at a police training college in Pretoria was another good move. It was less about removing player privilege than a desire to come up with some sort of public relations coup to placate a body of former players who felt their modern counterparts are being spoiled.

c) Related to the previous point was his decision to trim the unwieldly management team of Harry Viljoen. Again this went down well with those who had pilloried Viljoen and it enabled Straeuli to buy time. There was little material for his critics in those early fallow weeks when nothing was happening on the field. Of course, the streamlined management has also improved efficiency.

d) Every other year there have been claims of provincial bias, but not this one. Indeed, Straeuli made it known from an early stage that he would not be favouring his former Natal players when he chose almost twice as many Cape players in his first squad of the year. In the last test of the Tri-Nations, Straeuli had seven WP players, six Lions, one Falcon and just one Shark in his starting lineup.

e) There was little evidence of the mental block against certain players that other coaches might have perhaps been guilty of (Mallett on Hennie le Roux, Viljoen on Trevor Halstead, Rassie Erasmus etc). Just about every top player in South Africa was given a chance by Straeuli to state his case, with well over 30 players being used in the first four tests alone. The selection of Jannes Labuschagne proved inspired.

f) Straeuli's rotation policy in the early weeks was complemented by his decision to organise extra games at which players could prove their worth. The SA A game against Argentina facilitated the re-emergence of Neil de Kock and the elevation to test status of Lawrence Sephaka.

g) With the exception of the Sephaka incident in Wellington, Straeuli kept to the letter of the transformation policy of his employers. Considering that he had not so much as had a start in the Super 12 before the Tri-Nations started, it took tremendous guts on Straeuli's part to select him into the test team. In the end his policy of easing Sephaka in bit by bit paid off handsomely and the big prop finished the Tri-Nations with a full game against Australia.

h) While Straeuli is largely responsible for the emergence of what was initially an underrated Springbok pack into a respected unit, he has given Lane a free hand to work with and even select the backs. Unlike last year, when the Australian was presented with players who just did not measure up to what he wanted, this season he was able to coach the running game he believes in.

i) Straeuli has made far greater use of the expertise of former players. Even team doctor Uli Schmidt has been known to give sage advice to the forwards at scrum training.

j) Injured players or players currently not in the test team have been kept involved by Straeuli's decision to call players from each host union to practices in the week building up to matches. This has enabled someone like Mark Andrews to stay involved and given a wider scope of players the feeling that they have a stake in the Bok team.